Duty or safety? Exploring emergency service personnel\u27s perceptions of risk and decision-making when driving through floodwater by Ahmed, Mozumdar et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health - 
Papers: Part B Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health 
1-1-2020 
Duty or safety? Exploring emergency service personnel's perceptions of risk 
and decision-making when driving through floodwater 
Mozumdar Ahmed 
Macquarie University 
Katharine A. Haynes 
University of Wollongong, khaynes@uow.edu.au 
Matalena Tofa 
Gemma Hope 
Melanie R. Taylor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/smhpapers1 
Publication Details Citation 
Ahmed, M., Haynes, K. A., Tofa, M., Hope, G., & Taylor, M. R. (2020). Duty or safety? Exploring emergency 
service personnel's perceptions of risk and decision-making when driving through floodwater. Faculty of 
Science, Medicine and Health - Papers: Part B. Retrieved from https://ro.uow.edu.au/smhpapers1/1410 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Duty or safety? Exploring emergency service personnel's perceptions of risk and 
decision-making when driving through floodwater 
Abstract 
Vehicle-related flood fatalities and rescues due to driving through floodwater are a significant emergency 
management issue for emergency services. To reduce fatalities, injuries, and costs associated with this 
risky driving behaviour it is essential to develop strategies to stop or reduce the incidence of people 
driving through floodwater. In Australia, people are told not to enter floodwater – on foot or in vehicles – 
with the phrase ‘If it's flooded, forget it’ widely used in official messaging. As first responders responsible 
for floods, storms and tsunamis, Australian State Emergency Service (SES) personnel are working in flood 
conditions regularly and are considered an occupationally ‘at-risk’ group for driving through floodwater. 
Although SES agencies across states and territories in Australia are independently led, they typically 
promote policies of not entering floodwater to their personnel. Such policies are important for meeting 
duty of care obligations to employees, for protection of assets (vehicles and equipment), and for 
upholding organisational reputation (leading by example). This study was undertaken to explore the 
behaviour of driving through floodwater by SES personnel. The study explored the characteristics of those 
who have and have not driven through floodwater, and then used detailed situations in which SES 
personnel entered floodwater in vehicles to analyse their perception of risks, the conditions and contexts 
in which they entered floodwater, and to identify what influenced their decision to enter... 
Keywords 
safety?, exploring, emergency, service, personnel's, perceptions, risk, decision-making, when, driving, duty, 
floodwater 
Publication Details 
Ahmed, M. Arifa., Haynes, K., Tofa, M., Hope, G. & Taylor, M. (2020). Duty or safety? Exploring emergency 
service personnel's perceptions of risk and decision-making when driving through floodwater. Progress in 
Disaster Science, 5 100068-1-100068-14. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/smhpapers1/1410 
Regular article
Duty or safety? Exploring emergency service personnel's perceptions of risk
and decision-making when driving through floodwater
Mozumdar Arifa Ahmed a,⁎, Katharine Haynes b,c, Matalena Tofa a,b, Gemma Hope a, Mel Taylor a,b
a Department of Psychology, Faculty of Human Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109, Australia
b Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
c School of Earth, Atmospheric and Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, Health and Medicine, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
A B S T R A C TA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 13 July 2019
Received in revised form 9 January 2020
Accepted 14 January 2020
Available online 18 January 2020
Vehicle-relatedflood fatalities and rescues due to driving throughfloodwater are a significant emergencymanagement
issue for emergency services. To reduce fatalities, injuries, and costs associated with this risky driving behaviour it is
essential to develop strategies to stop or reduce the incidence of people driving through floodwater. In Australia, peo-
ple are told not to enter floodwater – on foot or in vehicles – with the phrase ‘If it's flooded, forget it’ widely used in
official messaging. As first responders responsible for floods, storms and tsunamis, Australian State Emergency Service
(SES) personnel are working in flood conditions regularly and are considered an occupationally ‘at-risk’ group for driv-
ing through floodwater. Although SES agencies across states and territories in Australia are independently led, they
typically promote policies of not entering floodwater to their personnel. Such policies are important for meeting
duty of care obligations to employees, for protection of assets (vehicles and equipment), and for upholding
organisational reputation (leading by example). This study was undertaken to explore the behaviour of driving
through floodwater by SES personnel. The study explored the characteristics of those who have and have not driven
through floodwater, and then used detailed situations in which SES personnel entered floodwater in vehicles to ana-
lyse their perception of risks, the conditions and contexts in which they entered floodwater, and to identify what influ-
enced their decision to enter.
Following an earlier systematic literature review, a detailed online questionnaire was developed and administered to
SES personnel from a single agency. Data from670 respondents indicated that 54.8%had driven throughfloodwater in
the previous two years, and a number of differences in the profile of thosewho had/had not driven throughfloodwater
were identified. Those more likely to have driven through floodwater includedmales, volunteer personnel with longer
lengths of service, those doing more driving hours per week, those deployed to work in flood conditions, and those
with current flood rescue qualifications. The location type, water depth, and water velocity were conditions that con-
tributedmore to perception of risk at the time personnel drove through the floodwater. Detailed information about an
experience of entering floodwater was obtained from 201 respondents who had driven through floodwater in SES ve-
hicles, and six factors relating to the decision to drive through floodwater were extracted. ‘Organisational training and
safety’, ‘External locus of control’ and ‘Absence of risk signals’ were identified as having the greatest influence on risk
perception leading to decisions to drive through floodwater. The findings of the study have a number of practical im-
plications for the improvement of occupational safety management; such as upgrading risk assessments strategies,
reviewing workplace health and safety policies, enhancing training, increasing skills and knowledge of emergency ser-
vices personnel about floodwater hazard situations, and improving internal flood risk communication.










People entering floodwater in vehicles is a leading cause of flood-
related drowning deaths globally [1–7]. In Australia, driving through
floodwater is a common flood experience for people [8]. Recent
Australian flood fatality data showed that at least 96 deaths occurred in
74 incidents between 2001 and 2017 due to flood-related vehicle accidents
with a mean of 1.3 fatalities per incident and the mean death toll across the
study time period was 5.7 fatalities per year [9]. According to post-mortem
reports, drowning was identified as the primary medical cause of death in
66% of the recorded fatalities (n = 96) and 24% occurred due to injury
while drowning [9]. State Emergency Service (SES) agencies in Australia
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devote significant time and money to rescuing people who have intention-
ally driven through floodwater in vehicles each year. One research study
[10] conducted following flash floods in the Hunter Valley (120 km north
of Sydney) on 8–9th June 2007 reported that, of the 36 rescues in the SES
dataset, 13 (36%) were rescuing people from vehicles. Information sourced
from the NSW SES website to the end of September 2016 indicates that
nearly 550 flood rescues have been performed by NSW SES in 2016 alone
[11]. During the flooding of June 2016, NSW SES performed 300 flood res-
cues, approximately a third of which involved rescuing people fromflooded
vehicles [11]. It is a significant emergency management challenge for SES
personnel to perform potentially life-threatening and costly rescue opera-
tions for vehicle-related incidents during floods each year, and for SES
agencies to communicate the dangers to the public to reduce the incidence
of this risky driving behaviour.
Generally, the nature of SES personnel's work in flood and storm con-
texts demands that theymake quick and safe decisions under time pressure
and changing conditions. This places them among the top of those profes-
sions who work in natural hazard-related emergency settings, in terms of
balancing their own safety with their duty.Working in hazardous situations
with vehicles in flood conditions engages these emergency workers in a po-
tentially complex combination of risk scenarios. Theymust arrive quickly at
the emergency scene, at any time of the day or night. Incidents may be lo-
cated in remote and difficult to access areas (mountainous or hilly areas,
bridge or river crossings with rapid, rising floodwater), with changing
and sometimes extremely difficult weather conditions (heavy rain and
wind), and with unknown road conditions (road grade, road pavement in-
tegrity, or road alignment underwater). A recent study in Australia [12] ex-
plored the lived experience of emergency service workers who undertake
flood rescues of those who have driven into floodwater. This interview-
based study identified four challenges: involvement of untrained personnel;
varying information provided by emergency telephone operators; behav-
iour of drivers complicating the rescue; and people sightseeing floods or
flood rescues or ignoring closed roads providing rescuers with sources of
distraction and frustration.
In general SES agencies rely on safety management practices and inter-
ventions to encourage their personnel to avoid floodwater risks, yet there is
no evidence available to know whether personnel adhere to these influ-
ences or if they are obliged to follow these safety policies as part of their
role. SES in the state of Victoria (VICSES) has recently developed opera-
tional doctrine to support personnel in assessing and managing the risk as-
sociated with encountering floodwater in VICSES vehicles [13]. In
addition, in revising its values, VICSES members agreed to incorporate
‘Safety Drives Our Decisions’ to reflect the importance of safety to the orga-
nisation, and this was rated as one of the highest of their five organisational
values [14]. Still it is important to acknowledge that because of the service
they provide, the organisation may never be able to create a regulation to
reduce risk to zero and stop its personnel from ever driving through flood-
water. However, this issue needs to be addressed as amatter of priority, as it
relates to occupational health and safety risks for this emergency service
group. To reduce the costs of physical damage to vehicles and other assets,
to protect personnel's lives, there is an urgent need to understand the real
experiences of SES personnel who have encountered and driven through
floodwater and the decisions that directed their actions. Thus, the aims of
the current study are to explore SES personnel's experiences of driving
through floodwater in SES vehicles; to see the differences between those
who had driven through and who did not, to explore their perception of
risks of a recalled incident of driving through floodwater, to identify what
influenced their decision-making to drive through, and to test whether
there is an association between their perceived level of risks and decision-
making factors.
1.1. Vehicle-related flood fatality research
Consideration of flood fatality research literature is important for help-
ing to understand the circumstances in cases where driving through
floodwater has been deadly. It also enables us to compare the circumstances
in which our SES personnel cohort had driven through floodwater.
International flood fatality research involving vehicles suggests that in-
correct assessment of flood conditions [3,15] and underestimating risks
[3,16,60] leads drivers to make inaccurate decisions which can lead to
fatal incidents. Flood conditions are typically described in research using
the following categories: floodwater characteristics (water flow and
depth), roadway characteristics (location, road type, crossing type), vehicle
characteristics (vehicle type and operation, e.g. four-wheel drive (4WD))
and environmental circumstances (weather, lighting). Floodwater charac-
teristics such as depth andflow are primary influencers of vehicle (in)stabil-
ity, and have been described in recent research [17]. Research on vehicle
stability in floodwater describes a three-phase process; of floating, sinking
and submersion [18]. Research has demonstrated that the floating phase
may last only 30 to 120 s, followed by the sinking phase, which is typically
completed within 2 to 4 min of contact with the water [18,19]. Research
into the dynamics of vehicles in floodwater has found that in fast-flowing
floodwater of 3m per second or greater, it can take just 15 cmoffloodwater
for a small vehicle to become unstable, and only 30 cm for four-wheel drive
(4WDs) vehicles [20]. Vehicles may enter floodwater upright, or roll due to
rapid flow [20].
The risks associated with driving through floodwater may also be deter-
mined by the characteristics of the location [3,16] and roadway character-
istics such as road structure type; roadway side barriers; road side
topography; downstreamdepths adjacent to the roadway; signage; warning
systems; lighting; road pavement; road alignment; road grade; speed re-
strictions; traffic volume, presence of road side markers and curb and gut-
tering [21]. Vehicle characteristics like vehicle size, type, or operational
drive control may also give drivers confidence in their ability which may
minimise the sense of risk [22].
One recent study [9] rigorously explored the circumstances of recent
vehicle-related deaths in Australia, to help understand the flood conditions
associated with vehicle-related flood fatalities. This research reported that
the shallowest water depth responsible for one fatal incident was only
20 cm. Almost two thirds of fatalities (63%) included reports of very fast
flowing and rapidly rising floodwater, and most victims (87%) were
attempting to cross creeks, low bridges or causeways.Much smaller propor-
tions (4%) occurred at a ford or weir, or on a normal stretch of (flooded)
road. Regarding the environmental conditions, the largest proportion of fa-
talities occurred in the evening and nightwhen itwas dark (50%) and in the
incidents that occurred at night, all reported an absence of adequate street
lighting.
1.2. Concepts from theories
Tounderstand the behaviour and underlying decision-making processes
of driving through floodwater by emergency services in occupational situa-
tions, the present study developed a conceptual framework based on psy-
chological theories. To address the behavioural and cognitive thinking
aspects, the study adopted concepts from two theories to help understand
behaviour, which had not been applied previously in driving throughflood-
water research. These theories are the Recognition Primed Decision-
Making Model (RPD) and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM).
1.2.1. The Recognition Primed Decision-Making Model (RPD)
Naturalistic decision-making research has shown that experienced peo-
ple under pressure in complex situations do not generally use the classical
approach to decision-making [23]. Under these circumstances, people
tend to operate in a manner depicted by the recognition-primed decision
(RPD) model [61]. RPD model development evolved from field observa-
tions and interviews with fire fighters, neonatal intensive care nurses, sur-
geons, weather forecasters, military field commanders and pilots. Thus,
the context for the research was situations that are circumstance-
dependent and may be subject to rapid change which appears to be a
goodfit with emergencyworkers' situations in natural hazard events. As de-
scribed by Klein et al. [[24]], the process involves a decision-maker
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noticing situation-generated cues, recognising patterns formed by the cues
(based on experience), focussing on a potential solution or ‘action script,’
and imagining potential outcomes of action implementation. The latter in-
volves experience again in the formof the decision-maker'smental model of
the overall operations. If the imagined outcome is ‘good enough,’ then the
action is implemented. In short, the RPD process highlights three simple
steps: experiencing the situation, analysing the situation, and implementing
the decision.
The current study utilised the RPD model approach to help conceptual-
ise the decision-making process for emergency service personnel in flood
situations. In these situations, they need to form a risk assessment based
on synthesis of a number of contextual and conditional components.
1.2.2. The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM)
EPPM is one of the major theories within the domain of psychological
research on health behaviour. Research using EPPM covers a large number
of health-related topics such as drug abuse [25], but EPPM has also been
used in vehicle-related behaviour, e.g. driver safety [26] and driver fatigue
[27]. However, studies applying EPPM to natural hazards situations have
not been identified to date. The EPPM posits that when presented with a
risk message, individuals engage in the following outcomes via two ap-
praisal processes: danger control process and fear control process [28]:
• Outcome I: Danger Control—People take protective action against the
threat.
• Outcome II: Fear Control—People in denial about threat react against it.
• Outcome III: Lesser Amount of Danger Control—People take some protec-
tive action, but are not motivated to do much.
• Outcome IV: No Response—People do not consider the threat to be real or
relevant to them, or are often not even aware of the threat.
1.2.3. Psychological research applied to driving though floodwaters
Previous research has provided a body of emerging evidence of the psy-
chological factors that influence individuals' decisions to drive through
floodwater [29,30,62] including past experience, attitudes, social pressure,
self-efficacy beliefs, and risk perceptions. Regarding the latter, the severity
of the risk has been shown to have an effect on reducing drivers' willingness
to enter floodwater [30].
Building on this previous research, Hamilton and colleagues have re-
cently conducted a series of studies using qualitative, mixed method, and
experimental designs to better understand the influences on individuals' be-
liefs and intentions to drive, and avoid driving, through floodwater
[31–34]. It is important to understand the differences in beliefs guiding be-
havioural alternatives (i.e. intentionally driving through, or avoiding driv-
ing through, floodwater) as there is research to suggest that performing
and not performing a given behaviour are not conceptual opposites. Differ-
ent motivational pathways may operate in guiding individuals' decisions to
engage (or avoid engaging) in an action or behaviour [35]. Findings from
two qualitative studies [32,34] investigating the beliefs influencing drivers'
decisions to drive and avoid driving through floodwaters are presented
below.
In a study exploring driver decisions through the lived experience,Ham-
ilton, Peden, Keech & Hagger [32] identified four overarching themes that
emerged from drivers' descriptions of factors that influenced their decision
to drive into floodwaters. These were past experience, individual factors,
the social and environmental context, and self-efficacy judgements. In a sec-
ond study investigating the psychological influences underpinning deci-
sions to avoid driving through floodwater, Hamilton et al. [34] identified
three overarching themes. Based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour
(TPB) belief-based framework, drivers' descriptions of factors that influ-
enced their decision to avoid driving through floodwaters were linked to
their behavioural beliefs, e.g. safety first and foremost, their normative be-
liefs, e.g. think of the rescuers, and their control beliefs, e.g. that the desti-
nation wasn't that important.
1.3. Conceptual framework for the current study
Supported by the previous research findings and theories just outlined,
the present study uses the following conceptual framework as a model for
the decision-making process of driving through floodwater for this emer-
gency service occupational group (Fig. 1).
Similar to the RPD process, the model (Fig. 1) proposes the steps of
decision-making including: experiencing the situation, analysing the situa-
tion, mental simulation of action, and implementing the decision into be-
haviour. Supported by findings from previous review papers [1,36] the
model proposes risk perception as the core aspect of the decision-making
process to take the decision to drive through floodwater.
The model features perception of risk determined by two components:
risk assessment factors and influences on decision-making. Risk assessment
informs risk perception through evaluating the physical characteristics of
the context and the environment, and a number of socio-cognitive factors
influence decision-making to guide risk processing and inform risk percep-
tion. After initial mental simulation of the action, the final steps of the
decision-making process include two processes from the EPPMmodel: pro-
tectionmotivation (danger control process), and defensivemotivation (fear
control). The outcome of these two processes leads into the final decision
being formed, which is then implemented into behaviour.
2. Methods
2.1. Study design and procedure
The study was administered using the online platform Survey Monkey.
The Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee granted eth-
ical approval for this study on 12th September 2017 (Reference number:
5201700133). Participation was voluntary, with all participants ensured
confidentiality and anonymity of responses prior to commencing. Partici-
pants were recruited via an email from the SES Deputy Commissioner en-
dorsing the study, which was sent to all personnel. This email was
distributed when the study opened on the 16th July 2018 and a reminder
email was sent one week prior to the study closing date, which was the
13th of August 2018.
2.2. Participants
A non-random convenience sample of SES personnel (N=670) was re-
cruited via email. The average age range of the respondents was
45–54 years. The majority of respondents (77.1%, n = 517) were over
35 years of age,with just over two thirds beingmale (67.9%, n=455). Vol-
unteer personnel made up the majority of the sample (89.1%, n = 597),
and most (80.6%, n = 540) had held a full driving licence for >10 years.
The majority (91.5%, n = 184,) had experience of deployment to local
flood events. Almost three quarters (73.1%, n = 490) had received flood
rescue training to aminimal level of qualification. Participants had received
a range of other relevant training experience with over three quarters
(78.1%, n = 157) receiving general operational driver training and just
under half (48.8%, n = 98) receiving four-wheel drive vehicle training.
2.3. Measures
The behaviour of interest in this study is the act of driving through
floodwater by SES personnel driving an SES vehicle, i.e. the person in com-
mand of the vehicle. The term floodwater was defined based on a definition
provided by the Australian Government Department of Geoscience
Australia [63]: “an overflowing of water onto land that is normally dry
and is not limited to roads”. This study employed a more driving- and
road-specific definition that was agreed in consultationwith SES project of-
ficers before the study so that it would be relevant to personnel.
Participants received the definition of floodwater in the following way.
“Currently, there is no clear definition of floodwater. For the purposes
of this survey, we will define floodwater as an environment with:
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1. Water across the road surface.
2. Little to no visibility of the road surface markings under the water
(i.e., uncertain of road quality/integrity and possibly depth).
3. Water on normally dry land – flowing or still
Based on the floodwater definition above…”
After this definition was presented, participants were asked three ques-
tions; How many times they had driven through floodwater in the last two
years in an SES vehicle - as a driver, howmany times they had been driven
through floodwater in an SES vehicle - as a passenger, and howmany times
they had driven through floodwater in their own private vehicles - as a
driver (responses were Never, 1–2 times, 3–6 times,>6 times). Then the re-
spondentswere asked “Can you recall an event inwhich you drove (orwere
driven) through floodwater in an SES vehicle - ideally the most memorable
occasion in the last few years?”. The objective was to explore their experi-
ences of entering floodwater in SES vehicles.
2.3.1. Exploratory variables
In addition to a range of demographic variables, the questionnaire in-
cluded the following contextual variables, linked to the specific incident
of driving throughfloodwater that they had recalled, tomeasure risk assess-
ment factors, decision-making influences, and level of perceived risk associ-
ated with the recalled incident of driving through floodwater.
2.3.1.1. Key factors of risk assessment. To measure the key factors of risk as-
sessment the following variable categories were included in this study:
2.3.1.2. Spatial characteristics. Previous research on flood fatalities in
Australia has focused on geographical locations [8,10,37–39], road charac-
teristics [21], residential location of drowning victim, and the remoteness
of the incidents [39] as important factors for flood fatalities. The present
study included location type (urban, suburban, regional, rural and remote);
road type (major, minor/suburban, sealed, unsealed, causeway) and type of
crossing (a low-water crossing, bridge, or causeway, a ford or weir, a nor-
mal stretch of road) as spatial variables to explore how these variables influ-
enced the decisions taken.
2.3.1.3. Environmental characteristics. Environmental components, such as
time of day, lighting conditions, and weather have been found to influence
both the cognitive process of floodwater hazard identification on roads and
decision-making [16]. It has been hypothesised that drivers at night/in
dark conditions are either not able to see flooded roads and possibly enter
floodwater by accident [5], or they are not able to assess the depth and ve-
locity of water due to poor visibility [16]. To identify the environmental
variables in this study, time of day (lighting conditions (daylight, dark day-
light, dawn/dusk, night with streetlight, night with no streetlight)) and
weather conditions (clear, overcast, light rain, steady rain, heavy rain)
were assessed.
2.3.1.4. Floodwater characteristics during incident. Previous studies have
found that water characteristics such as water depth, water flow, and pres-
ence of debris ormud have significant influence on driver's decisionmaking
to enter floodwater. Floodwaters can submerge vehicles or sweep them
away. Motorists may enter floodwaters unexpectedly [15] or find them-
selves in circumstances where floodwaters rise around their vehicle [40].
In the present study, the variable water depth at the time of the driving in-
cident was measured using a 6-point categorical scale grouped as A. “Less
than 15 cm”, B. “15 cm to 30 cm”, C. “30 cm to 45 cm”, D. “45 cm to
60 cm”, E. “60 cm to 95 cm”, and F. “Greater than 95 cm”. To reduce incon-
sistency in their estimations of the depth of each category level, participants
were provided with an image as a reference with the instruction that ‘water
heights are shown against a sedan - to help estimate the depth’ (Fig. 2). The
present study also included water flow as a variable to understand the
Fig. 1. Conceptual decision-making model of driving through floodwater for emergency service personnel.
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characteristics of water in drivers' decision-making (still, slow, medium/
moderate, rapid/swift flow).
2.3.1.5. Vehicle characteristics. Research in Australia which explored the
types of vehicles driven through floodwater, found that they varied consid-
erably in size and type [22]. In a study [39], rates of non-aquatic transport
flood related drownings per 100,000 registered vehicles were calculated
using Australian vehicle registration data. The vehicle types used in that
study [39] were - passenger vehicles (car, four-wheel drives (4WD)), light
commercial vehicles (utilities), rigid trucks (heavy vehicles, machinery)
and motorcycles (motorbikes, All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs)). For emergency
response in operational situations, SES is well equippedwith vehicles suited
to their work. However, SES personnel also drive work passenger vehicles,
as well as their own private vehicles in the context of their work, e.g. in day
to day situations, travelling to/from duty and deployments. In consultation
with SES, the study included vehicle types representative of all SES vehi-
cles, e.g. medium/heavy truck, light truck/dual cab, passenger vehicle,
and other types of SES vehicles (SUV, Ute etc.). Vehicle operation (all-
wheel drive, four-wheel drive, and two-wheel drive) was also included sep-
arately to capture the potential influence of the ability of the vehicle (as
well as size) on the driver's willingness to drive through floodwater [29].
2.3.1.6. Influences on decision-making. The study used a list of 18 potential
influences to explore socio-cognitive and other potential influences on
drivers' decision-making processes. These included environmental cues, in-
dividual attitudes and situational contexts (e.g. journey characteristics), ef-
ficacy responses, social influences, past experience, familiarity with road
and place, organisational safety attitude and professional skills and knowl-
edge. The items (see Table 1) were based on the findings of previous re-
search [1,31]. Respondents were asked the extent to which these 18
aspects influenced their decision to drive through the floodwater on this oc-
casion. A 7-point Likert scale of response choices was used, ranging from
(1) not at all to (7) a great deal.
2.3.1.7. Perception of risk. A single item was used to assess the level of per-
ceived risk when the driver drove through the floodwater. Respondents
were asked “How risky do you think it was to drive through floodwater
on this occasion?” A slider scale was used to indicate the level of perceived
risk, with endpoints labelled ‘not at all risky’ to ‘extremely risky’. The slider
registered values from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
2.3.1.8. Demographic information. Demographic and background informa-
tion collected in this study included:
▪ Age, in categories, ranging from 18 to 75 or older
▪ Gender, in categories, male, female, rather not say
▪ Years holding full driving licence, with response categories ranging
from “0 (still Provisional/Learner status)” to “More than 10 years”
▪ Average number of hours driving each week, with categories ranging
from “less than 2 hours”, to “15 or more hours”
▪ Years' experience as a paid, or unpaid SESmember, with responses rang-
ing from “Less than one year” to “More than 20 years”
▪ Current qualifications in Flood Rescue, with responses ranging from
“Yes, Flood Rescue Awareness” to “No, I have no Flood Rescue Qualifi-
cations”
▪ The respondents were asked “Do you get deployed to work in flood/
storm conditions?” with responses options “Yes” or “No”.
▪ Frequency of driving SES vehicles, with responses ranging from
“Rarely” to “All the time”
2.4. Approach to analysis
All data analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sci-
ences (SPSS version 25). Both non-parametric (chi-square, k-means cluster
analyses and principal component analyses for factor analyses) and
Fig. 2. Image provided in the survey as a reference for depth of water driven through.
Table 1





1 The journey was urgent
2 No alternative route
3 Impractical alternative route (time/distance)
4 Lack of signage/indicators to show depth or danger
5 Behaviour of others, e.g. others driving through without problems
6 Careful consideration of the situation
7 Knowing the road well
8 Driving through floodwater previously without problem
9 Professional SES training/knowledge
10 Reassurance or encouragement from others in the vehicle
11 Belief in my own physical ability to drive through
12 Close proximity to destination/operational situation
13 Gut-feeling that it would be all right
14 Being directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council
15 SES's attitude towards safety
16 Excitement - it being fun to do
17 Organisational pressure to complete my duty
18 My personal desire to complete my duty
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parametric (correlations and linear regressions) statistical tests were used
in conducting different stages of analyses in this study. Data analysis was
undertaken in a number of phases; first with the full sample (n = 670) in-
cluding both those who had driven into floodwater and those who had
not, then with the subsample who had driven through floodwater and pro-
vided detailed information about a specific incident when they drove
through floodwater in a work context (n=201). This progressive approach
to analysis was used to explore the following research questions:
Phase 1: Chi square and post hoc tests
For the whole sample:
▪ Are there any differences in terms of demographic variables between
those who have, and have not, driven through floodwater in the last
two years?
Phase 2: Descriptive statistics, frequency and percentage distribution
For those who had driven through floodwater in the last two years:
▪ What are the contexts and conditions in which SES personnel have
driven through floodwater?
▪ What are the key factors that influenced risk perception when SES per-
sonnel drove through floodwater?
Phase 3: K-means cluster analyses, chi square test and multiple
regression
In relation to a specific incident of driving through floodwater
▪ What was the level of risk perceived at the time of the incident?
▪ What are the relationships between the expected risk factors and risk
perception of the incident?
▪ Which risk factors contributed more to risk perception when they drove
through floodwater?
Phase 4: Exploratory factor analysis - Principal component analysis
▪ What are the key factors influencing decision-making that are asso-
ciated with driving through floodwater?
Phase 5: Correlation and Hierarchical multiple regression
▪ Is there any association between risk perception and the key
decision-making factors that are associated with driving through
floodwater?
▪ Which decision-making factors predict risk perception in situa-
tions that led to driving through floodwater?
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Phase 1. Exploring demographic differences between those who have, and
have not, driven through floodwater
Overall, in the sample of 670 SES personnel, 54.8% (n = 367) had
driven through floodwater as a driver in the last two years, compared to
45.2% (n = 303) who reported not having driven through.
Using a chi square analysis, significant relationships were revealed be-
tween the decision to drive through floodwaters in the last two years and
participant demographics. These included: age; gender; years of holding a
full licence; length of service with the SES; driving hours per week; flood
rescue qualifications; frequency of driving an SESwork vehicle; and deploy-
ment to work in floodwater conditions (see Table 2). Post hoc analysis of
the multilevel variables within the chi square was undertaken. Fisher's
exact approach and odds ratio analysis were then used to determine what
level of participant demographics were contributing to the observed
variance.
Analysis by age, found that those over 55 years of age were least likely
to have driven through floodwater. Compared to this group, those aged 18
to 34, and those aged 35–55 were significantly more likely to have driven
through (OR 2.07 and 1.44, respectively), χ2 (2, N = 666) = 9.747,
p> .0076. A two-way chi square revealed a significant relationship between
gender and driving through floodwater, with males more likely to have
driven through floodwaters in the last two years (OR 2.03).
Most participants had held a full driving licence for 10 years or more
(82%). This group was more likely to have driven through floodwater in
the last two years, compared to those who had held their driving licence
for less than ten years (OR 1.79). The amount of time an individual spent
driving each week was found to relate to whether they had driven through
floodwaters in the last two years. Generally, more time spent driving on av-
erage each week related to an increasingly greater likelihood of having
driven through floodwater, e.g. those who drove >15 h per week on aver-
age were 5.6 times more likely to drive through floodwaters than individ-
uals who drove <2 h per week, χ2 (3, N = 146) = 14.75, p > .002.
Increasing length of service, for volunteer personnel, was associated a
lower likelihood of having driven through floodwater in the last two
years. Generally, those with over ten years of service were least likely to
drive through floodwaters, with individuals with 5–10 years' service
(1.37 times more likely) and those with <5 years' experience (1.75
times) more likely to have driven through floodwaters in the last two years.
Two-way chi square analysis revealed significant differences in the in-
creased likelihood of having driven through floodwater in the last two
years for those who had current flood rescue qualifications compared to
those without flood rescue qualifications (OR 1.94), and those who get de-
ployed to work in floodwaters (OR 1.81) compared to those who don't get
deployed.
Post hoc analysis of frequency of driving SES vehicles found that indi-
viduals who rarely drove an SES vehicle were the least likely to have driven
through floodwaters in the last two years χ2 (3, N = 338) = 21.752,
p > .000, compared to individuals that drove an SES vehicle all the time
(OR 1.28), those who drove an SES vehicle often (OR 2.56) and, those
who drove an SES vehicle occasionally (OR 2.12).
This phase of analysis revealed that even though personnel are encour-
aged by the organisation not to drive through floodwater at work, the pro-
portion of participants who had driven through in the last two years was
high (54%). Interestingly, in this occupational sample male personnel
were found to be significantly more likely to drive through floodwater
than females. This supports findings in the literature that males are more
likely to engage in driving through floodwater
([3,4,7,16,22,29,38,39,41]; Drobot et al., 2007).
Findings regarding age in this study indicate there might be differences
in driving through floodwater between public and SES personnel. A recent
study of self-reported flood-related behaviour of river users in Australia
[42] reported that those aged 75+ years (42.9%) and 65–74 years old
(40.7%) were the highest proportion of respondents who had driven
through floodwaters; whereas in the present study younger male SES per-
sonnel aged 18–34 and 35–55 years were significantly more likely to
have driven through floodwater.
The results regarding length of driving experience and flood deploy-
ment indicated that those who had been driving longer and those who
get deployed to work in floods and storms were more likely to have driven
through floodwater. These former findings suggest that experience, and
possibly confidence, play a part in driving through floodwater. Obviously,
those who are deployed to work in flood conditions are likely to have
been exposed more to floodwater on the road in the last two years.
Therefore, a combination of confidence and familiarity with driving in
flood conditions, as well as increased exposure/potential to drive
through floodwater may be having an influence. Analysis found that
SES personnel who have current flood rescue qualifications are also
more likely to have experience of driving through floodwater in the
last two years. Again, there is potential that such individuals will have
been sent to perform flood rescues in flood conditions and therefore
been exposed to floodwater on the road when travelling. However, it
is also more likely that they will have received training more recently
and have been educated about the risks involved with floodwater.
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Training might also increase confidence, leading to personnel
minimising the risks of driving through floodwater on roads.
3.2. Phase 2: Exploring the conditions in which SES personnel drove through
floodwater
To explore the conditions and contexts of the floodwater when they
drove through it, participants were asked to recall their most recent or
memorable experience of entering floodwater with vehicles in work condi-
tions, ideally in the last few years. A total of 201 participants completed this
detailed section. Table 4 summarises the various characteristics and condi-
tions in which participants reported driving through floodwater.
Regarding spatial and environmental characteristics, around half of
these incidents (49.3%, n = 99) took place in rural and remote areas, and
a similar proportion of incidents (54.2%, n = 109) occurred on minor or
residential road. Interestingly, a majority drove through the floodwater
on a normal stretch of road (78.1%, n=157). A noted earlier, recent fatal-
ity data indicated that a large majority of fatalities (87%) took place when
vehicles were driven across creeks, bridges or causeways [9], suggesting
that most of the incidents described by participants are likely to have not
been life threatening in terms of this specific aspect.
Although around two thirds of incidents occurred in daylight (64.2%,
n = 129), just under a quarter took place at night (23.4%, n = 47) and
22 of these incidents (10.9%) occurred in locations without street lighting.
In these latter situations, it is likely that accurate assessment of the
floodwater conditions would have been challenging. It was raining in
51.7% of incidents (n = 104), which varied from light rain to heavy rain.
In terms of the floodwater characteristics of water depth and water
flow, both key factors known to affect vehicle stability, around three quar-
ters of incidents occurred in water that was estimated to be >15 cm deep
(77.1%, n = 155). This is above the level at which some vehicles are at a
risk of becoming unstable [17] and above a level that is generally commu-
nicated to the public to be particularly unsafe to enter through the “15 to
float” campaign Victoria SES 2017 [43]. The results regarding velocity of
water indicated that although SES personnel took risks entering deeper
water, they mostly drove through water with low velocity (slow or still
water) (92.0%, n = 185). A minority of incidents (16.9%, n = 34) took
place in water deeper than 45 cm, and 7.9% (n = 16) took place in water
with moderate or rapid flow. Clearly, these less frequent but seemingly
more risky incidents need to be investigated more closely.
In terms of vehicle characteristics, dual cabs/light truck vehicles were
most frequently being driven (44.2%, n = 89) and in the majority of inci-
dents vehicles were four-wheel drive (67.7%, n= 136) indicating that ve-
hicles typically larger and heavier than passenger vehicles were mostly
being driven when floodwater was entered.
Activities being undertaken at the time of entering floodwater were,
most commonly, emergency response ‘under lights and sirens’ (i.e. urgent
response) (n=101, 51%) and emergency response ‘not under lights and si-
rens’ 31% (n = 61). Other responses included undertaking a private jour-
ney (21%; n = 42), travelling to/from an SES unit (17%; n = 35), and
Table 2
Frequencies, percentages, and adjusted standardised residuals (ASR) for driving through floodwaters in the last two years.
Variables Had driven through floodwater once or more in the last two years
No Yes Total χ2 (p value)
f % fe ASRa f % fe ASRa
Gender
Male 179 26.7 205.8 −4.5 276 41.2 249.2 4.5 455 19.812, p = .001
Female 124 18.5 97.2 4.5 91 13.6 117.8 −4.5 215
Age
18 to 34 52 34.8 67.3 −2.8 97 65.1 81.6 2.8 149 12.575, p = .002
35 to 54 111 43.5 115.2 −0.6 144 56.4 139.7 0.6 255
55 and above 138 52.6 118.4 3.1 124 47.3 143.5 −3.1 262
Years holding full driving licence
<10 years 39 5.8 52.5 −2.8 79 11.8 65.5 2.8 118 7.669, p = .006
More than 10 years 254 37.9 240.5 2.8 286 42.7 299.5 −2.8 540
Driving hours per week
Less than 2 h 37 5.5 23.3 4.0 15 2.2 28.7 −4.0 52 27.572, p = .001
2–7 h 132 19.7 122.7 1.5 142 21.2 151.3 −1.5 274
8–14 h 81 12.1 83.7 −0.5 106 15.8 103.3 0.5 187
15 h or more 45 6.7 65.4 −3.8 101 15.1 80.6 3.8 146
Length of service (paid personnel)
<5 years 31 4.6 29.0 0.7 32 4.8 34.0 −0.7 63 0.601, p = .740
5–10 years 11 1.6 12.4 −0.6 16 2.4 14.6 0.6 27
More than 10 years 11 1.6 11.5 −0.2 14 2.1 13.5 0.2 25
Length of service (volunteer personnel)
<5 years 130 19.4 112.8 2.9 129 19.3 146.2 −2.9 259 10.005, p = .007
5–10 years 52 7.8 52.3 −0.1 68 10.1 67.7 0.1 120
More than 10 years 78 11.6 94.9 −2.9 140 20.9 123.1 2.9 218
Current flood rescue qualifications
Yes 196 29.3 216.1 −3.7 294 43.9 273.9 3.7 490 13.412, p = .001
No, or not current 92 13.7 71.9 3.7 71 10.6 91.1 −3.7 163
Deployed to work in flood conditions
Yes 212 31.6 229.2 −3.2 298 44.5 280.8 3.2 510 10.206, p = .001
No 85 12.7 67.8 3.2 66 9.9 83.2 −3.2 151
Frequency of driving SES work vehicles
Rarely 119 17.8 92.0 4.7 93 13.9 120.0 −4.7 212 23.715, p = .001
Occasionally 78 11.6 89.8 −2.0 129 19.3 117.2 2.0 207
Often 54 8.1 70.3 −3.0 108 16.1 91.7 3.0 162
All the time 8 1.2 6.9 0.5 8 1.2 9.1 −0.5 16
a The adjusted standardised residual is the observed frequency—expected frequency/estimated standard error.
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routine work (11%, n = 23). This clearly supports expectations that occu-
pational exposure and the nature of emergency service work is a risk factor
for this group. In a third of incidents (32.8%, n = 66) visible signage indi-
cating flooded road conditions, such as road closure, depth indicators and
flood warnings signage was present, but was ignored. In just under two
thirds of reported incidents (64.2%, n= 129) there was no visible signage
on the road when they drove through. In 2015, Austroads, the peak body
for road management in Australia, stated that the vast majority of the ap-
proximate 20,000 floodways in Australia and New Zealand were not con-
structed in accordance with required design and hydraulic standards, and
lacked appropriate signage. They also reported that depth gauges could
be misinterpreted, posing a risk to road users in flood situations [44].
3.3. Phase 3: Relationship between key risk assessment factors and risk
perception
The conceptual decision-making model of the present study (Fig. 1) in-
dicated that risk assessment factors (spatial, environmental, floodwater, ve-
hicle characteristics) existing at the time of the incident contribute to
construct the individual's risk perception. This part of the analysis sought
to identify the relationship between risk assessment factors and level of
risk perception, and verify the degree of contribution of those risk factors
to risk perception.
To investigate the level of perceived risk associated with the reported
incidents of driving through floodwater a K-means cluster analysis, using
the z-scores, was performed on the variable ‘perceived risk’. This approach
was used to divide the sample into two risk typologies; thosewho perceived
the incident to be higher (High) risk, and those who perceived the incident
to be lower (Low) risk. This K-means cluster analysis is summarised in
Table 3.
The first cluster, labelled ‘low risk’ comprised 83.6% (n = 168) partic-
ipants, and the second cluster labelled ‘high risk’ comprised 16.4% (n =
33). Next chi square analyses were conducted to investigate differences be-
tween these two clusters in terms of incident-specific contextual variables.
The results from chi square analysis presented in Table 4 revealed that
within the lower perceived risk group themajority of reported incidents oc-
curred in urban/suburban and regional areas (55.9.%; n = 94), whereas
within the higher perceived risk group the majority of reported incidents
occurred in rural/remote areas (75.7%; n = 26) (χ2 = 11.209,
p < .005). In terms of water depth, 93.9% of reported incidents (n = 31)
in the high perceived risk group occurred when the water height was
>15 cm compared to 73.8% (n = 124) for the low perceived risk group
(χ2 = 6.33, p < .01).
The most highly statistically significant result was found for water ve-
locity (χ2 = 20.099, p < .001). Only 4.1% (n = 7) of reported incidents
perceived to be low risk occurred with high water velocity, compared to
27.2% (n = 9) of those reported to be high risk. Differences were not
found to be statistically significant for other variables like road type, cross-
ing type, lighting conditions, weather conditions and vehicle operation
type.
Overall, results suggest that risk perception was most differentiated by
the three key features: location, water depth and water flow. Based on
these results multiple regression analysis was conducted to see which
category of these three variables contributed more to predict risk percep-
tion (Table 5).
Multiple regression analysis using dummy coding for categorical vari-
ables (location, water depth and water velocity) revealed that perception
of risk was significantly associated with these three variables. The results
indicated that those driving in rural/remote areas, or where water depth
was >15 cm, and in situations with high water velocity were more likely
to perceive the risk of their driving through floodwater incident as high.
Conversely, they were more likely to perceive the risk of driving through
floodwater as ‘low risk’ when the location was urban/suburban, or water
depth was <15 cm, or water velocity was low (slow/still).
Examining how emergency services personnel perceived the risks of
driving through floodwater and investigating the relationships between
the key risk factors and their link to risk perception is helpful for a better un-
derstanding of the risk assessment process when entering floodwater. From
the overall result of this phase of the analysis, it can be concluded that these
three characteristics –water depth, water flow, and location, played an im-
portant role in the risk assessment of SES personnel. Although how these
three features work together is not identified in this study, it is nonetheless
evident that these key features contribute significantly to risk perception,
and could usefully be exploited in engagement and communication around
the risks of driving in floodwater.
3.4. Phase 4: Factors influencing decision-making
In our conceptual model (Fig. 1), socio-cognitive influences form a large
part of the risk processing component of the model. These affect the ‘situa-
tional analysis’ along with the key factors of risk assessment to inform risk
perception.
To identify the key influences on decision-making during the incident of
driving through floodwater in this study, exploratory factor analysis was
conducted on the set of 18 influencing items used in the questionnaire,
using principal components analysis (PCA) as the method of factor extrac-
tion. To decide what factors to retain, the study used the scree plot. Initially
an oblique rotation was used to assess factor correlation and later varimax
was used as a final rotation. Individual loadings of 0.40 or greater were
used in the factor designation. Extracted factors were examined and
named based on an analysis of the items loading on each factor. Cronbach
alpha (α) was used to estimate the internal consistency of the items consti-
tuting a factor. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test and Bartlett test of Sphericity
were undertaken. This analysis indicated that the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin coef-
ficient for this dataset was 0.735 and the Bartlett test of Sphericity was sta-
tistically significant (χ2 = 742.809, df = 153, P< .0001) indicating that
properties of the correlation matrix justified factor analysis being carried
out. Table 6 shows the factor loading score for each item.
Varimax factor rotation identified six latent factors. Extraction of factors
was based both upon Kaiser's criterion for Eigenvalues of equal to or greater
than unity and use of a Scree plot. The six factors identified accounted for
60.0% of the total variance within the data (see Table 7). One of the
items (“close proximity to destination”) was removed, as its highest factor
loading was below 0.30. In addition, the item had low communality scores,
indicating that the extracted factors explain little of these items' variance. A
sixth factor contained a single item (“lack of signage/indicators to show
depth or danger”); this factor was retained, as the item had a high factor
loading and it was uncorrelated with other variables.
Significant factor loadings were used to identify and interpret themes,
then each factor was labelled with a factor name that the research team
felt best represented the overarching theme. The first factor, labelled
“Organisational training and safety” describes the professional experiences,
training and knowledge participants felt they had to negotiate the risks of
driving inflood conditions. This factor encompasses three items covering is-
sues such as professional SES training/knowledge; SES's attitude towards
safety and careful consideration of the situation. This factor accounted for
20.86% of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of 3.75.
The second factor labelled “External locus of control” refers to how
much people attribute the decision to drive through floodwater to external
Table 3
















** p < 0.01.
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factors. People with a high internal locus of control (‘internals’) tend to be-
lieve that most things that happen are their own fault, regardless of objec-
tive cause. On the other hand, those with a high external locus of control
(‘externals’) tend not to accept blame for anything, preferring instead to be-
lieve in environmental reasons, even if they have clearly instigated an inci-
dent. In the present research, three items that generally covered external
influences loaded onto this factor. The items are organisational pressure
to complete my duty, my personal desire to complete my duty, and being
directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council.
Although the second item contained an element of internal motivation
(‘my personal desire’) it was felt that it was the external act of ‘duty’ or ser-
vice to others that was being triggered in the context of these other
externally-driven items for this factor. This factor accounted for 11.03%
of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of 1.98.
The third factor, labelled “Self-efficacy judgement”, grouped together
items that appeared to describe a combination of self-efficacy and opti-
mism. Self-efficacy is the belief in one's own ability to do something [45].
Self-efficacy refers here to the belief of the driver that the behaviour – “driv-
ing through floodwater” can be executed successfully. This encompasses
four items covering issues such as gut feeling that it would be all right,
knowing the road well, driving through floodwater previously without
problem, and belief in my own physical ability to drive through. This factor
accounted for 8.46% of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of
1.52.
The fourth factor labelled as “Journey characteristics” comprises three
items and covers issues such as no alternative route, urgency to continue
journey and impractical alternatives to change journey plan based on
time and distance. This factor accounted for 7.74% of the variance and
had a total eigenvalue of 1.39.
The fifth factor labelled “Social influences” includes items that describe
the perceived social pressures or encouragements from others to perform
the behaviour. This factor comprises three items covering the behaviour
of others, e.g. others driving through without problems, reassurance or en-
couragement from others in the vehicle, and the behaviour being exciting
‘fun to do’. This factor accounted for 6.28% of the total variance and had
a total eigenvalue of 1.13.
The final, sixth, factor labelled “Absence of risk signals” related to the
absence of warnings, signage and indicators that signal danger. This factor
included only one item and accounted for 5.64% of the variance and had an
Eigenvalue of 1.01.
Previous research findings supported the relevance of these themes as
key influences in driving and health behaviour-related contexts. Rogers
[46] states that “There is a fundamental link between training, experience
Table 4
Frequencies, percentages, and adjusted standardised residuals (ASR) for the contexts and conditions in which SES personnel drove through floodwater and the level of per-
ceived risk associated with these incidents.
Contextual variables Low perceived risk High perceived risk Total χ2
ƒ % ƒe ASR ƒ % ƒe ASR
Location type
Urban/suburban 63 37.5 57.7 2.1 6 18.2 11.3 −2.1 69 11.209, p = .004**
Regional 31 18.4 27.6 1.8 2 6.06 5.4 −1.8 33
Rural/remote 74 44.0 82.7 −3.3 25 75.7 16.3 3.3 99
Road type
Highway/major 45 26.7 47.6 −1.1 12 36.3 9.4 1.1 57 3.552, p = .169
Minor/residential 96 57.1 91.1 1.9 13 39. 17.9 −1.9 109
Unsealed/track 27 16.0 29.3 −1.1 8 24.2 5.7 1.1 35
Crossing type
Normal stretch of road 133 79.1 131.2 0.8 24 72.7 25.8 −0.8 157 1.389, p = .499
A ford or weir 8 4.7 7.5 0.4 1 3.03 1.5 −0.4 9
Bridge or causeway 27 16.0 29.3 −1.1 8 24.2 5.7 1.1 35
Depth of water
Less than 15 cm 44 26.1 38.4 2.5 2 6.06 7.6 −2.5 46 6.33, p = .012
>15 cm 124 73.8 129.6 −2.5 31 93.9 25.4 2.5 155
Water velocity
Low 161 95.8 154.6 4.5 24 72.7 30.4 −4.5 185 20.099, p < .001***
High 7 4.1 13.4 −4.5 9 27.2 2.6 4.5 16
Lighting conditions
Day light 113 67.2 107.8 2.1 16 48.4 21.2 −2.1 129 5.847, p = .054
Dusk/dawn 21 12.5 20.9 0.1 4 12.1 4.1 −0.1 25
Night - dark 34 0.59 39.3 −2.4 13 39.3 7.7 2.4 47
Weather conditions
Rain 84 50.0 86.9 −1.1 20 60.6 15.9 1.1 104 1.243, p = .265
No rain 84 50.0 81.1 1.1 13 39.9 17.1 −1.1 97
Vehicles operation type
4WD 116 69.0 113.7 0.9 20 60.6 22.3 −0.9 136 0.898, p = .343
AWD/2WD 53 31.5 54.3 −0.9 12 36.3 10.7 0.9 65
a The adjusted standardised residual is the observed frequency—expected frequency/estimated standard error.
⁎ p <0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
Table 5
Summary of multiple regression analysis for location, water depth and water veloc-
ity on perceived level of risk.
Factors β SE B R R2 df F
Location 0.238 0.057 198 5.94⁎⁎
Rural/remote 0.231⁎ 3.3
Urban/suburban −0.010 3.5
Depth of water 0.189 0.036 199 7.37⁎⁎
Less than 15 cm 0.189⁎⁎ 2.8
Water velocity 0.342 0.117 199 26.32⁎⁎⁎
High 0.342⁎⁎⁎ 4.1
* p < 0.05.
** p <0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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and technological competence that provides the knowledge required to
make intuitive decisions.” Locus of control research [47] shows that it
clearly relates to driving in areas such as skill and accident involvement.
Individuals with an internal locus of control are more attentive, moti-
vated, and adept at avoiding aversive situations; hence, internality is nega-
tively related to accident involvement [47]. Perceived self-efficacy [48] in
contexts such as health behaviour change [49–51] has been associated
with adaptive behaviours and more positive outcomes. In recent years,
route-choice modelling has been the topic of several theoretical studies
[52] which indicate that journey characteristics, specifically travellers'
route choice, are important in decision-making aspects of driving. For ex-
ample, Lindsey et al. [53] studied the effects of pre-trip information on
route-choice decisions when travel conditions are congested and stochastic,
and Yang and Jiang [54] developed an enhanced route choicemodel which
can realistically identify risk attitudes and time reliability demands.
Regarding social influences, in disaster situations where options are
often ambiguous and decisions need to be made quickly, it is argued that
people often look to see what other people are doing to manage the situa-
tion and then act accordingly [55]. Research findings are also evident for
the significance of risk signals. Prior research in the United States has
found that drivers make judgements on whether to drive through floodwa-
ters based on visual cues in the environment such as depth indicator signs
[56,57]. The themes that emerged from factor analyses in the present
study are grouped differently to previous psychological research applied
to driving though floodwaters [31] where the key influences on driver de-
cisionmakingwere themed as successful past experiences, individual delib-
erative motivational and impulsive influences, social and environmental
context, and judgements of self-efficacy.
3.5. Phase 5: Predicting perceived level of risks from the factors that influence
decision-making
Previously research [31] has identified the key influences on driver
decision-making. However, how those influences relate with each other
and work in a model of decision-making has not been explored. In this
final phase of analysis, we sought to use quantitative statistical methods
to investigate the link between socio-cognitive influences of risk perception
in the set of incidents in which SES personnel drove through floodwater.
A six-step hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed on
the dependent variable of perceived level of risk. The ‘Organisational train-
ing and safety’ factor was entered in step 1. The ‘External locus of control
factor’ was entered at step 2, the ‘Self-efficacy judgement’ factor at step 3,
‘Journey characteristics’ at step 4, ‘Social influences’ at step 5, and ‘Absence
of risk signals’ at step 6. Intercorrelations between the multiple regression
factors are reported in Table 8 and the regression statistics are in Table 9.
The hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one,
organisational training and safety contributed significantly to the regres-
sion model, F (1,199)= 17.58, p< .01 and accounted for 8.1% of the var-
iation in perceived level of risk. Introducing the external locus of control
factor explained an additional 2.7% of variation in perceived risk level
and this change in R2 was significant, Fchange (1,198) = 6.002, p < .05.
Adding self-efficacy judgement, Fchange (1,197) = 0.285, p > .05 at
stage 3; Journey characteristics, Fchange (1,196) = 2.39, p > .05 at stage
4 and Social influences, Fchange (1,195) = 3.08, p > .05 at stage 5 to the
regression model explained additional 0.1%; 1.1% and 1.4% of the varia-
tion in perceived risk level, respectively and this change in R2 was not sig-
nificant (p > .05). Finally, the addition of Absence of risk signals to the
regressionmodel explained an additional 2.3%of the variation in perceived
risk level and this change in R2 square was also significant, F (1,194) =
5.18, p < .05. When all six independent variables were included in the
final stage of the regression model, External locus of control was not a sig-
nificant predictor of perceived risk. The most important predictor of per-
ceived risk was Organisational training and safety, which uniquely
explained 28.5% of the variance. Together the six independent variables
accounted for 39.6% of the variance in perceived risk.
The results of the analysis indicated that the organisational training,
knowledge and safety factor was significantly negatively associated with
perceived risk, and had themost significant contribution to risk perception.
It revealed that those who felt their professional skills, training and safety
attitudes had a greater influence on their decision to drive through flood-
water were more likely to perceive the risk of driving through the
Table 6
Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation of influences on decision-making.
Items Factors
1 2 3 4 5 6
The journey was urgent 0.312 0.203 −0.004 0.661 −0.310 0.079
No alternative route 0.215 0.105 0.166 0.661 −0.065 0.074
Impractical alternative route (time/distance) −0.154 −0.028 0.134 0.745 0.208 −0.026
Lack of signage/indicators to show depth or danger −0.066 0.022 −0.059 0.086 0.124 0.885
Behaviour of others, e.g. others driving through without problems 0.021 −0.123 0.046 0.101 0.804 0.175
Careful consideration of the situation 0.625 −0.090 0.154 0.223 0.046 −0.359
Knowing the road well 0.141 −0.287 0.662 0.101 −0.128 −0.047
Driving through floodwater previously without problem 0.094 0.183 0.666 0.240 0.063 −0.112
Professional SES training/knowledge 0.820 0.062 0.116 0.083 −0.086 0.051
Reassurance or encouragement from others in the vehicle 0.362 0.318 −0.009 −0.002 0.433 −0.058
Belief in my own physical ability to drive through 0.430 0.078 0.672 0.070 −0.037 0.017
Close proximity to destination/operational situation 0.283 0.225 0.303 0.317 0.105 0.323
Gut-feeling that it would be all right −0.152 0.247 0.709 −0.031 0.274 0.097
Being directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council −0.055 0.595 −0.072 0.221 0.288 −0.230
SES's attitude towards safety 0.682 0.135 0.062 0.016 0.104 0.038
Excitement - it being fun to do −0.008 0.360 0.092 −0.215 0.487 0.008
Organisational pressure to complete my duty 0.084 0.805 0.048 0.028 −0.021 0.072
My personal desire to complete my duty 0.208 0.742 0.206 0.126 −0.054 0.162
Extraction method: principal component analysis.
Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization.
Note. Factor loadings >0.40 are in boldface.
Table 7
Total variance explained by principal component analysis for influencing factors of
decision-making.
Component Extraction sums of squared loadings
Total % of variance Cumulative %
1 Organisational training and safety 3.755 20.861 20.861
2 External locus of control 1.986 11.031 31.892
3 Self-efficacy judgements 1.524 8.465 40.357
4 Journey characteristics 1.394 7.747 48.103
5 Social influences 1.131 6.283 54.386
6 Absence of risk signals 1.015 5.640 60.026
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floodwater on that occasion as low. Seemingly, belief in being highly
trained and skilled at considering risks in the situation at hand was associ-
ated with feeling it was not risky to drive through the floodwater. On the
other hand, the external locus of control factor was significantly positively
associatedwith perceived level of risk. This suggests that an increased sense
of duty and organisational pressure to perform one's duty was associated
with driving through floodwater that was considered higher risk.
Absence of risk signals was the other remaining factor that was linked to
perceived risk. The analysis indicated that absence of risk signals (road
signage, depth markers, warnings and messages) was significantly posi-
tively associatedwith perception of risk, such that thosewho felt that an ab-
sence of risk signals contributed more to their decision to drive through
floodwater also felt it was riskier when they drove through the floodwater.
4. Applications/implications of the study
There is no similar research exploring the situations in which emer-
gency services personnel engage in risky driving behaviour in floodwater,
or other contexts. The findings of the study have a number of practical im-
plications for the development of occupational safety management strate-
gies to ensure the safety of the emergency services personnel in
operational contexts and to prevent and reduce the number and severity
of injuries and associated costs of driving through floodwater on roads.
4.1. Practical implications of the study
4.1.1. Educational awareness, skills training and knowledge
Emergency workers need to be provided with the knowledge and skills
to enable them to assess the risk associatedwith the differentfloodwater sit-
uations they may encounter during their operational activities. This in-
cludes understanding of the consequences of those risks and possible
preventivemeasures thatmay be taken tomitigate risks. As the general pol-
icy is not to enter floodwater, there is no current training program in the
SES organisation under study that was related to driving in floodwater.
The findings of the study revealed that certain groups such as younger per-
sonnel (aged 35–55 years), volunteer personnel with<10 years' of service,
those who are often deployed in floods and those who frequently drive SES
vehicles were more likely to drive through floodwater Additional training
or interventions might be designed that are tailored to different groups of
personnel, e.g. ‘refresher’ training for thosewith longer service, or ‘focussed
risk analysis training’ for those with greater frequency of flood deployment
or who work in more dangerous operational conditions for longer periods
of time. This study's findings suggest that more training is required for iden-
tification of water-related hazards on roads during flood, as well as the de-
velopment of more effective risk assessment strategies and more effective
internal flood risk messaging. Given the prevalence of driving through
Table 8
Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between all variables (influencing factors of decision-making and perceived level of risk) in the model.
Sl. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD
1 Organisational training and safety – 14.01 4.72
2 External locus of control 0.224⁎⁎ 6.72 4.13
3 Self-efficacy judgements 0.317⁎⁎ 0.203⁎⁎ 16.11 5.98
4 Journey characteristics 0.274⁎⁎ 0.244⁎⁎ 0.287⁎⁎ 12.61 5.17
5 Social influences 0.133 0.264⁎⁎ 0.160⁎ 0.039 6.85 3.52
6 Absence of risk signals −0.100 0.076 −0.032 0.085 0.138 2.49 1.89
7 Perceived level of risk −0.285⁎⁎ 0.096 −0.102 0.042 0.103 0.219⁎⁎ 28.01 16.46
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Table 9
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting perceived level of risks.
Factors B SE B β R R2 ΔR2 F ΔF
Step 1 0.285 0.081 0.081 17.58⁎⁎ 17.58⁎⁎
Organisational training and safety −0.993 0.23 −0.285⁎⁎
Step 2 0.329 0.108 0.027 12.01⁎⁎ 6.002⁎
Organisational training and safety −1.125 0.24 −0.323⁎⁎
External locus of control 0.672 0.27 0.169⁎
Step 3 0.331 0.110 0.001 8.07⁎⁎ 0.285
Organisational training and safety −1.087 0.25 −0.312⁎⁎
External locus of control 0.693 0.27 0.174⁎
Self-efficacy judgements −0.105 0.19 −0.038
Step 4 0.347 0.120 0.011 6.69⁎⁎ 2.390
Organisational training and safety −1.155 0.25 −0.331⁎⁎
External locus of control 0.620 0.28 0.156⁎
Self-efficacy judgements −0.166 0.20 −0.060
Journey characteristics 0.356 0.23 0.112
Step 5 0.366 0.134 0.014 6.03⁎⁎ 3.082
Organisational training and safety −1.181 0.25 −0.339⁎⁎
External locus of control 0.500 0.28 0.126
Self-efficacy judgements −0.203 0.20 −0.074
Journey characteristics 0.383 0.23 0.120
Social influences 0.572 0.32 0.122
Step 6 0.396 0.156 0.023 5.99⁎⁎ 5.181⁎
Organisational training and safety −1.102 0.25 −0.316⁎⁎
External locus of control 0.469 0.28 0.118
Self-efficacy judgements −0.180 0.19 −0.066
Journey characteristics 0.323 0.22 0.102
Social influences 0.465 0.32 0.100
Absence of risk signals 1.337 0.58 0.154⁎
Note. n = 201.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01
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floodwater in work vehicles, increased engagement of personnel around
the dangers of driving in floodwater could be beneficial, with the use of
photographs, video clips, and scenarios as training tools. Facilitated group
discussions may help in influencing risk assessment and decision-making,
particularly in complex environments with competing priorities, e.g. per-
sonal vs. public safety.
4.1.2. Refining risk assessment strategies
Poor quality risk assessment and risk management, and poor decision-
making about risk, have been identified as contributing factors in work-
place fatality, injury, disease and ill-health and in many major disasters
[58]. Understanding and managing risk is central to achieving the out-
comes and targets of the Australian Work Health and Safety Strategy
2012–2022 [59]. The findings of the current research could be used to tai-
lor an effective risk assessments strategy for emergency services.
4.1.3. Improving organisational safety
The general guidance to avoid driving through floodwater and the rela-
tively high prevalence of driving through floodwater reported in this study
suggest that organisational policy and practice are not aligned. The need to
balance the workplace health and safety of personnel with operational re-
quirements and the risk associated with saving lives presents complex
organisational challenges. The results of this study can be used to inform
further discussions and act as a baseline for further safety interventions,
or serve as a catalyst for policy review and reform.
The results of this study also have implications for existing safety man-
agement practices, through exploring common beliefs and attitudes to-
wards safety as part of possible intervention strategies. The findings
reveal that more needs to be done to explore the organisational safety cli-
mate (the shared perceptions of safety policies and practices among person-
nel of the organisation) regarding entering floodwater in vehicles.
4.1.4. Flood risk communication public messaging and campaigns
Providing critical safety and preparedness information to help commu-
nities prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies and disasters is
one of the major functions of the SES. The findings of the study could help
SES designmore effective flood risk communicationmessaging for the pub-
lic and enhance community emergency response capacity and capability.
Identifying factors that influence SES personnel when driving through
floodwater might be transferable to the decision-making of the public.
Therefore, these research findings may help to design more effective public
messaging campaigns to reduce driving through floodwater.
Although it was not an aim of this research to make direct comparisons
between the emergency services (SES) and the general public, some tenta-
tive demographic comparisons could be possible from the findings of this
study and studies of the general public. In terms of the findings being trans-
ferrable to the general public, the findings of this study possess useful in-
sights for future research that, if the comparisons could be drawn in
meaningful way, could benefit both groups to reduce the risks of driving
through floodwater.
5. Strengths and limitations of the study
This study is the first of its kind in Australia to investigate emergency
services personnel driving through floodwater. The current study has a
number of strengths. The use of a definition of floodwater on the road,
and a reference image for estimating the depth of water driven through
were important additions to the study that will have resulted in better qual-
ity data. The use of an independent research team investigating safety prac-
tices and ensuring the anonymity of respondent, should also have improved
the integrity of the data. The studywas supported by seniormanagement in
the SES and the sample size was adequate for statistical power in analysis.
The survey collected very detailed information about the contexts and con-
ditions in which SES personnel drove through floodwater, and the data col-
lected has the potential to be very useful for the organisation in
understanding the behaviour of its personnel and for improving
occupational health and safety. However, like any study of this nature,
there are a number of limitations that need to be acknowledged. The first,
is that the participants of this study were from an East Coast jurisdiction
of SESwhichmight not be representative of all jurisdictions in Australia. Al-
though the sample size is adequate for analysis, statistical findings should
be viewed as vigorous, but indicative of the sample, rather than representa-
tive of the whole organisation. Moreover, as the study only provides find-
ings from a single Australian State's SES agency, similar research in other
states or territories may identify different results, particularly those in
northern states more prone to flooding during wet season and with less
dense and more dispersed populations.
Second, this is a cross sectional study and provides only a snapshot of a
set of incidents, not all incidents, of driving through floodwater. As we re-
quested details about a single recent memorable incident, participants
probably recalled more salient, and possibly more extreme, incidents. Al-
though choosing a more salient incident may offset some effects of recall
bias, it is possible that a combination of recall bias, especially for less recent
incidents, and social desirability (expected social norm) may have influ-
enced the choice of incident reported.
In relation to the degree of risk associated with an incident, we have no
way of knowing objectively how risky or safe it was. Assessment of water
flow is likely to be subjective, as noted in the vehicle stability study of
Smith et al. [20]. Judgement of flow velocity (and often depth) is difficult
in real world situations. Additional variables, such as weather-related vari-
ables, e.g. poor visibility due to heavy rain or strong wind, may also influ-
ence the assessment of water depth and flow. However, the subjective
judgement of these attributes is used to inform decision-making and deter-
mine behaviour in the situations reported here and therefore the self-report
of these characteristics is still a valid measure to explore in this study.
In an organisational situation where SES personnel are discouraged
from driving through floodwater, there would potential for embarrassment
in admitting to acting unsafely, therefore participants may have felt a need
to minimise or excuse their risk-taking in the way they answered some
questions, although we would expect that assurances of anonymity and
confidentiality would have reduced some of these impacts. Finally, the
study included the EPPM theory concepts in the final step of the decision-
making model, which proposed that individual's fear, or danger control
processes turn mental simulation outcomes into action. However, the
study could not assess and interpret clearly how these two processes (fear
or danger) relate to risk perception. Further research is required to explore
the relevance of the EPPM theory constructs in this decision-making model
of driving through floodwater behaviour to further explore and verify the
model.
6. Conclusion
This research contributes to our understanding about risk perception
and how it relates to driving throughfloodwater by emergency services per-
sonnel. The study found that, despite general guidance not to enter flood-
water, more than half of those surveyed had driven through floodwater in
the last two years in work vehicles. Males, those doing more driving per
week, and volunteers with >10 years SES experience were among some
of the groups more likely to have driven through floodwater in the last
two years. Most incidents of driving through floodwater occurred in non-
urgent responses (i.e. not under lights and sirens), with adequate light (dur-
ing the day), in good weather condition (no rain), crossing water on a nor-
mal stretch of (flooded) road, with low water flow. These factors helped
respondents drive through floodwater successfully on most occasions with-
out damage to vehicles or personal injuries. As driving in floodwater is dis-
couraged, it is interesting to consider why many respondents took risks
driving through floodwater when they were unable to be certain of the
safety of the situation (e.g. water flow, road integrity) to perform non-
urgent work. Although there is only a small number of cases, some person-
nel drove through floodwater in conditions when the risk of harm was per-
ceived to be greater, i.e. through water deeper than 15 cm, at night with no
streetlights, in steady or heavy rain, or ignoring road signage.
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Location, water depth, and flow contributed notably to risk perception
and three factors that influenced the decision to drive through floodwater
were found to be most strongly associated with risk perception. These
were ‘Organisational training and safety’, ‘External locus of control’ and
‘Absence of risk signals’. Thus, SES personnel who felt their professional
skills and training and careful consideration of the situation contributed
to their decision also felt that risks were lower when they drove through
floodwater. Conversely, high external locus of control and an absence of
risk signals (warnings, signs and indicators) led personnel to perceive
higher risks when they drove through floodwater.
The results from this study indicate that more needs to be done to com-
municate the risks of entering floodwater in work vehicles. These findings
identify some key aspects that have salience in risk processing and risk per-
ception that can be used to help design more effective risk assessment strat-
egies, to design training tools and safety programs, and to contribute overall
to improvements in workplace health and safety management practices.
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